Analysis of Public Statements made by Secretary of State Colin Powell
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| The Bush Administration's Public Statements on Iraq |
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| Secretary of State Colin Powell on Chemical and Biological Weapons: |
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| "Our conservative estimate is that Iraq today has a stockpile of between 100 and 500 tons of chemical weapons agent. That is enough agent to fill 16,000 battlefield rockets. Even the low end of 100 tons of agent would enable Saddam Hussein to cause mass casualties across more than 100 square miles of territory, an area nearly five times the size of Manhattan." |
| Source: Remarks to the United Nations Security Council, United Nations (2/5/2003). |
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Explanation This statement was misleading because it evoked a lethal threat to millions of individuals from Iraq's chemical weapons but failed to acknowledge that the U.S. intelligence community had reported on Iraq's chemical wapons capabilities with qualifiers and lack of specificity. In addition, the statement failed to acknowledge a 2002 Defense Intelligence Agency report that concluded: "There is no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons or where Iraq has -- or will -- establish its chemical warfare agent production facilities." | | |
| The Bush Administration's Public Statements on Iraq |
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| Secretary of State Colin Powell on Chemical and Biological Weapons: |
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| "Now, umanned aerial vehicles, UAVs. Iraq has been working on a variety of UAVs for more than a decade. This is just illustrative of what a UAV would look like. This effort has included attempts to modify for unmanned flight the MiG-21 and, with greater success, an aircraft called the L-29. However, Iraq is now concentrating not on these airplanes but on developing and testing smaller UAVs such as this. UAVs are well suited for dispensing chemical and biological weapons. There is ample evidence that Iraq has dedicated much effort to developing and testing spray devices that could be adapted for UAVs." |
| Source: Remarks to the United Nations Security Council, United Nations (2/5/2003). |
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Explanation This statement was misleading because it claimed that Iraq's UAVs were intended and able to spread chemical or biological weapons, but failed to mention that the U.S. government agency most knowledgeable about UAVs and their potential applications, the Air Force's National Air and Space Intelligence Center, had the following view: the "U.S. Air Force does not agree that Iraq is developing UAVs primarily intended to be delivery platforms for chemical and biological (CBW) agents." | | |
| The Bush Administration's Public Statements on Iraq |
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| Secretary of State Colin Powell on Chemical and Biological Weapons: |
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| "Saddam Hussein has chemical weapons." |
| Source: Remarks to the United Nations Security Council, United Nations (2/5/2003). |
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Explanation This statement was misleading because it professed certainty when the intelligence community provided only an "estimate." According to CIA Director George Tenet, "it is important to underline the word estimate. Because not everything we analyze can be known to a standard of absolute proof." In addition, the statement failed to acknowledge the Defense Intelligence Agency position that: "There is no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons or where Iraq has -- or will -- establish its chemical warfare agent production facilities." | | |
| The Bush Administration's Public Statements on Iraq |
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| Secretary of State Colin Powell on Al-Qaeda: |
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| "But what I want to bring to your attention today is the potentially much more sinister nexus between Iraq and the Al Qaeda terrorist network, a nexus that combines classic terrorist organizations and modern methods of murder. Iraq today harbors a deadly terrorist network headed by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi an associate and collaborator of Usama bin Laden and his al-Qaida lieutenants. . . . From his terrorist network in Iraq, Zarqawi can direct his network in the Middle East and beyond. . . . We are not surprised that Iraq is harboring Zarqawi and his subordinates. This understanding builds on decades-long experience with respect to ties between Iraq and al-Qaida. . . . A detained al-Qaida member tells us that Saddam was more willing to assist al-Qaida after the 1998 bombings of our embassies . . . . Some believe, some claim, these contacts do not amount to much. They say Saddam Hussein's secular tyranny and al-Qaida's religious tyranny do not mix. I am not comforted by this thought. Ambition and hatred are enough to bring Iraq and al-Qaida together, enough so al-Qaida could learn how to build more sophisticated bombs and learn how to forge documents, and enough so that al-Qaida could turn to Iraq for help in acquiring expertise on weapons of mass destruction." |
| Source: Remarks to the United Nations Security Council, United Nations (2/5/2003). |
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Explanation This presentation was misleading because it heavily emphasized reports supporting the assertion that a relationship between Iraq and Al Qaeda existed that posed a real threat to the United States, when in fact the U.S. intelligence community had conflicting evidence on this issue and was divided regarding whether there was an operational relationship. While Secretary Powell, unlike several other top administration officials, included a reference to the fact that "some believe" that the contacts "don't amount to much," he did not make clear that this was a view within the U.S. intelligence community, and further he was dismissive of this position. | | |
| The Bush Administration's Public Statements on Iraq |
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| Secretary of State Colin Powell on Al-Qaeda: |
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| "And, perhaps most critically, the President confirmed that Iraq has open channels and ties to terrorist organizations, including al Qaeda." |
| Source: "We Will Not Shrink From War", Wall Street Journal (2/3/2003). |
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Explanation This statement was misleading because it suggested that Iraq was providing support to al Qaeda. In fact, the U.S. intelligence community had conflicting evidence on this issue and was divided regarding whether there was an operational relationship. | | |
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