Analysis of Public Statements made by National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice
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| The Bush Administration's Public Statements on Iraq |
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| National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice on Nuclear Capabilities: |
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| "[H]e had . . . an active procurement network to procure items, many of which, by the way, were on the prohibited list of the nuclear suppliers group. There's a reason that they were on the prohibited list of the nuclear supplies group: Magnets, balancing machines, yes, aluminum tubes, about which the consensus view was that they were suitable for use in centrifuges to spin material for nuclear weapons." |
| Source: NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, PBS (7/30/2003). |
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Explanation This statement was misleading because it suggested that Iraq sought aluminum tubes for use in its nuclear weapons program, failing to mention that the government's most experienced technical experts at the U.S. Department of Energy concluded that the tubes were "poorly suited" for this purpose. | | |
| The Bush Administration's Public Statements on Iraq |
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| National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice on Nuclear Capabilities: |
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| "My only point is that, in retrospect, knowing that some of the documents underneath may have been--were, indeed, forgeries, and knowing that apparently there were concerns swirling around about this, had we known that at the time, we would not have put it in. . . . And had there been even a peep that the agency did not want that sentence in or that George Tenet did not want that sentence in, that the director of Central Intelligence did not want it in, it would have been gone." |
| Source: Face the Nation, CBS (7/13/2003). |
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Explanation Ms. Rice was responding to questions regarding how the claim that Iraq sought uranium in Africa made it into the President's January 28, 2003, State of the Union address. The statement that the Director of Central Intelligence and the CIA did not object to the claim was false. In October 2002, the CIA expressed doubts about the claim in two memos to the White House, including one addressed to Ms. Rice. Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet also warned against using the claim in a telephone call to Ms. Rice's deputy in October 2002. | | |
| The Bush Administration's Public Statements on Iraq |
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| National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice on Nuclear Capabilities: |
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| "So the process is an NIE that is the basis of this, and then if the Agency had reservations about information that was in the NIE, then the DCI -- and I think he will tell you that if he had reservations, he did not make those known to the President, to the Vice President, or to me -- if he had reservations." |
| Source: Press Gaggle with Ari Fleischer and Dr. Condoleezza Rice En Route Entebbe, Uganda, White House (7/11/2003). |
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Explanation This statement was false. Ms. Rice was claiming in this statement that the doubts intelligence officials had regarding the claim in the National Intelligence Estimate that Iraq sought uranium in Africa were not communicated to her. In fact, following the issuance of the National Intelligence Estimate, the CIA expressed doubts about the uranium claim in two memos to the White House, including one addressed to Ms. Rice. In addition, shortly after the issuance of the NIE, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet warned against using the claim in a telephone call to Ms. Rice's deputy. | | |
| The Bush Administration's Public Statements on Iraq |
|
| National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice on Nuclear Capabilities: |
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| "The only thing that was there in the NIE was a kind of a standard INR footnote, which is kind of 59 pages away from the bulk of the NIE. That's the only thing that's there. And you have footnotes all the time in CIA - I mean, in NIEs. So if there was a concern about the underlying intelligence there, the President was unaware of that concern and as was I." |
| Source: Press Gaggle with Ari Fleischer and Dr. Condoleezza Rice En Route Entebbe, Uganda, White House (7/11/2003). |
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Explanation This statement was false. Ms. Rice was claiming in this statement that the doubts intelligence officials had regarding the claim in the National Intelligence Estimate that Iraq sought uranium in Africa were not communicated to her. In fact, following the issuance of the National Intelligence Estimate, the CIA expressed doubts about the uranium claim in two memos to the White House, including one addressed to Ms. Rice. In addition, shortly after the issuance of the NIE, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet warned against using the claim in a telephone call to Ms. Rice's deputy. Further, the fact that INR objected to the NIE's nuclear statements was noted prominently in the first paragraph of the NIE's key judgments. | | |
| The Bush Administration's Public Statements on Iraq |
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| National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice on Nuclear Capabilities: |
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| "Now, I can tell you, if the CIA, the Director of Central Intelligence, had said, take this out of the speech, it would have been gone, without question. What we've said subsequently is, knowing what we now know, that some of the Niger documents were apparently forged, we wouldn't have put this in the President's speech - but that's knowing what we know now." |
| Source: Press Gaggle with Ari Fleischer and Dr. Condoleezza Rice En Route Entebbe, Uganda, White House (7/11/2003). |
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Explanation The statement that the CIA did not object to the uranium claim is false. In October 2002, the CIA sent two memos to the White House, including one addressed to Ms. Rice, that raised concerns about the claim. In addition, in October 2002, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet warned against using the claim in a telephone call to Ms. Rice's deputy. | | |
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